Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades

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CSC 1989

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SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

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��

�� Command and Staff College

�� Marine Corps Combat Development Center

�� Quantico, Virginia

�

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�� Reorganizing the Fleet Marine Force:

�� From Division-Wing Teams to Marine Expeditionary Brigades

�

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�� Major Joseph H. Schmid, U. S. Marine Corps

��

�� 15 May 1989

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�� ABSTRACT

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NAME:�� MAJOR JOSEPH H. SCHMID, USMC

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TITLE:� REORGANIZING THE FLEET MARINE FORCES:

�� FROM DIVSION-WING TEAMS TO MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADES

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DATE:�� 9 JUNE 1989

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�� This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces

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around permanent Marine Expeditionary Brigades.� After reviewing

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the current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces down to the

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battalion and squadron level, a discussion of the problems

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arising out of the current organization is offered.� The

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reorganization plan has two goals--to resolve the problems with

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the current organization and to reduce the number of headquarters.

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A reduction in the number of headquarters would allow conversion

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of the associated manpower structure to that for warfighting

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elements.� The proposed organization is analyzed from the

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perspective of its impact on the the ground combat element, the

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air combat element, the combat service support element, the

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command� element,� manpower structure,� and on Title� 10,� United

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States Code.

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�� The paper concludes that reorganization to permanent Marine

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Expeditionary Brigades is possible without a reduction in mission

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capabilities.� The conclusion summarizes both the problems

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resolved by the proposed plan and those left unresolved.

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�� TABLE OF CONTENTS

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�� Page

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List of Figures�� iii

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Preface�� iv

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Chapter

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I.�� Introduction�� 1

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�� Current Organization of the Fleet Marine� Forces�� 1

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�� Statement of the Problem�� 7

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�� Statement of the Proposal�� 15

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II.� Analysis�� 21

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�� Impact on Ground Combat Element�� 21

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�� Impact on Aviation Combat Element�� 28

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�� Impact on Combat Service Support Element�� 42

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�� Impact on Command Element�� 44

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�� Impact on Manpower Structure�� 47

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�� Impact on Public Law�� 52

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III. Conclusions�� 56

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Figures�� 58

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Anotated Bibliography�� 78

�� LIST OF FIGURES

�� Page

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1.�� Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic�� 58

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2.�� 2d Marine Division�� 59

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3.�� 2d Marine Aircraft Wing�� 60

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4.�� 2d Force Service Support Group�� 61

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5.�� Fleet Marine Force, Pacific�� 62

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6.�� I Marine Expeditionary Force� ��63

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7.�� 1st Marine Division�� 64

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8.�� 3d Marine Aircraft Wing�� 65

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9.�� 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade�� 66

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10.� III Marine Expeditionary Brigade�� 67

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11.� 3d Marine Division�� 68

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12.� 1st Marine Aircraft Wing�� 69

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13.� I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed)�� 70

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14.� III Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed)�� 71

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15.� Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Amphibious)�� 72

�� (proposed)

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16.� Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Maritime�� 73

�� Prepositioning Force) (proposed)

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17.� Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Reserve�� 74

�� Mobilization) (proposed)

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18.� Aviation Organization (proposed)�� 75

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19.� Brigade Service Support Group (proposed)�� 76

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20.� Distribution of Enlisted Marines�� 77

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21.� Distribution of Marine Officers�� 77

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�

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�� PREFACE

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�� This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces

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into Marine Expeditionary Brigades.� In analyzing the effect of

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this proposal, the focus was on the manpower structure depicted

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in Tables of Organization for Fleet Marine Force units.� The

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analysis of this proposal was admittedly limited in several ways.

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First, the Tables of Equipment were not examined; thus, the

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effect of this proposal on unit equipment was not addressed.

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The political consequences of billet reductions within the Fleet

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Marine Forces were also not considered.� The effect on manpower

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structure by programmed-weapons systems was not included in this

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analysis.

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�� Sources for this paper ranged from published articles and

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books to official Marine Corps documents, memoranda and personal

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letters.� Documents and memoranda were obtained from staff

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copies.� Personal letters from representatives of the Commanders-

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in-Chief of the Unified Commands were in response to requests

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from the author.� Citations for sources are keyed to the

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bibliography entry number and source page number.� A citation

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such as (40-31) refers to entry 40 in the bibliography, page 31.

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�� CHAPTER I

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�� INTRODUCTION

��

�� Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces

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�� The organizations of the Fleet Marine Forces vary between

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the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.� However, there are some

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command relationships that are similar to each.� Regardless of

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the fleet, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, is a

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type commander responsible for the administration and training

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of all of his subordinate units.� The subordinate units of the

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Fleet Marine Forces come under the operational control of the

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Commanders- in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic or Pacific Fleets, when

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deployed.

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�� Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic is organized as shown in

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Figure 1. Reporting directly to the Commanding General, Fleet

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Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) are the Commanding General,

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II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Commanding

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Officers of three Marine Expeditionary Units (22d, 24th, 26th

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MEU's).� The Commanding General, II MEF, exercises operational

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control over the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marine Aircraft

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Wing, the 2d Force Service Support Group, the 4th Marine

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Expeditionary Brigade, and the 6th Marine Expeditionary

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Brigade (MEB).� Each of these commands have standing

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headquarters, or "command elements" as they are known in

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Marine jargon.

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�� However, the 2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing,

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and 2d Force Service Support Group are the only major

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subordinate commands that have permanently assigned forces.

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The Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the Marine Expeditionary

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Units have designated forces.� Designated forces are

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squadrons, battalions, and companies that are earmarked for

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deployment with Marine Expeditionary Brigades and Units.

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These designated forces remain under the command and control

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of their parent command until deployment, at which time

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command and control is shifted. This double counting is not

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limited to just the operating forces.� The Commanding

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General, FMFLant, is "double-hatted" as Commanding General,

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II MEF.� The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is also

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"double-hatted" as Deputy Commander, II MEF.

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�� The major subordinate commands of II MEF have fairly

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traditional organizations.� The Second Marine Division is

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organized as shown in Figure 2.� This is the standard

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divisional organization of a headquarters battalion, three

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infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and five

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independent battalions - assault amphibian, combat engineer,

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light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tank.� Recent

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decisions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps have changed

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the internal organization of many of the battalions within the

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Marine Division in order to enhance the combat readiness of

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those units (1).� Among these changes were the placing in

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cadre the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, adding scout infantrymen

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to and redesignating the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion as

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the Light Armored Infantry Battalion, adding a fourth rifle

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company to each of the battalions in 8th Marines, and

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reassigning the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines from the 3d Marine

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Division to the 2d Marine Division.

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�� The Second Marine Aircraft Wing does not have a table of

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organization since, by doctrine, it is task organized to

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perform the six functions of Marine aviation - assault

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support, offensive air support, aerial reconnaissance,

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electronic warfare, anti-air warfare, and control of aircraft

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and missiles.� However, like all Marine Aircraft Wings, it has

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a Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron, a Marine Wing Support

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Group, a Marine Air Control Group, and aircraft groups

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composed of helicopter, attack, and fighter aircraft, as shown

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in Figure 3.� The Second Force Service Support Group (FSSG) is

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organized, as all FSSG's are, into eight battalions, each

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fulfilling one of the eight functions of combat service

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support.� This organization is clearly shown in Figure 4.

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�� Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), has units spread

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across the Pacific Ocean and, thus, does not have as neat

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organizational charts as its counterpart in the Atlantic.

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Reporting directly to the Commanding General, FMFPac, are the

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Commanding Generals, I Marine Expeditionary Force and 1st

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Marine Expeditionary Brigade.� The Commanding General, III

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Marine Expeditionary Force, is forward deployed to Okinawa,

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Japan, and is under the operational control of the Commander,

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U.S. 7th Fleet, and under the administrative control of the

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Commanding General, FMFPac.� These command relationships are

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shown in Figure 5.

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�� Major subordinate commands of I MEF are the 1st Marine

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Division, 1st Force Service Support Group, 3rd Marine Aircraft

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Wing, 5th and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and the 11th,

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13th, and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units.� The organization

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of the 1st Marine Division is shown in Figure 7.� The Division

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has a structure similar to that of 2d Marine Division.� The

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notable exception is that 1st Marine Division has four rifle

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companies in each infantry battalion.� Like the 2d Marine

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Division, the 1st Marine Division also had to place an

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infantry battalion in cadre to provide the fourth rifle

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company to the battalions in the 1st Marine Regiment.

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However, the fourth battalion in each regiment was obtained by

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permanently reassigning four battalions from the 3d Marine

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Division to the 1st Marine Division.

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�� Third Marine Aircraft Wing is task organized as shown in

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Figure 8.� Performing the same functions as the 2d Marine

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Aircraft Wing, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing also has control,

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support and aircraft groups.� However, the number of fighter,

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attack, and helicopter groups and squadrons differs between

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the two wings.

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�� As with II MEF, only the 1st Marine Division, 1st Force

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Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing have

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forces permanently assigned.� The Expeditionary Brigades and

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Units, similar to those in II MEF, have forces only designated

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for their use.� As with II MEF, the Commanding Generals are

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also "double hatted" in I MEF.� The Commanding General, I MEF

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is also the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.� The

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Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the

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Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division.� The

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Commanding General, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is

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also the base commander at the Marine Corps Air-Ground

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Training Center, 29 Palms, California.� The Commanding

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Officer, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is also serves as

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Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command,

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Pacific.

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�� The First Marine Expeditionary Brigade, located at

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Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is the only expeditionary brigade with

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forces permanently assigned.� It is composed of a regimental

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landing team, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Brigade Service

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Support Group, as shown is Figure 9.� The regimental landing

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team has three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion.

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The Marine Aircraft Group has four medium helicopter

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squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one light/attack

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helicopter detachment, four fighter squadrons, and a Marine

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Air Control Squadron.� Although designated as a Marine

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Expeditionary Brigade, the 1st MEB, with its assigned forces,

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does not have the combat capability of any of the other

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expeditionary brigades with their designated forces.� The

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assigned forces do not reflect the table of organization for

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the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade's mission.

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�� III Marine Expeditionary Force, the forward deployed MEF

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in the Western Pacific, has the most inferior combat power of

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any of the expeditionary forces.� As shown in Figure 10, III

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MEF is composed of 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft

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Wing, 3d Force Service Support Group, and 9th Marine

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Expeditionary Brigade.� III MEF is the only expeditionary

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force that does not man forward deployed expeditionary units.

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However, the MEU's from I MEF, when forward deployed, come

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under the operational control of the Commanding General, III

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MEF.� Like the expeditionary brigades in the other MEF's, 9th

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Marine Expeditionary Brigade is merely a headquarters with

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forces designated to it.� Of the other major subordinate

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commands, only 3d Force Service Support Group is of

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comparable size and organization to its companion groups in

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the other MEF's.

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�� The organizations of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st

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Marine Aircraft Wing are depicted in Figures 11 and 12,

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respectively.� 3d Marine Division has only two infantry

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regiments with two battalions each.� Each of these infantry

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battalions is permanently assigned to either the 1st or the 2d

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Marine Division and is serving with the 3d Marine Division on

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a six-month deployment in accordance with the Unit Deployment

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Program.� The Division's artillery regiment has only two

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direct support battalions and has a general support battalion

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equipped with towed 155mm howitzers vice a general support

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battalion equipped with self-propelled 155mm howitzers and

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self-propelled 8-inch guns.� Among the independent battalions,

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1st Armored Assault Battalion is composed of two tank

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companies and two amphibious assault companies.� The other

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divisions have tank and amphibious assault battalions, each

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with four companies.

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�� First Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength

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compared to the other aircraft wings.� 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

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has fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft groups, a support group,

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and a control group.� However, among these groups the Wing has

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only two fighter, one attack, one all-weather attack, one

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medium helicopter, one heavy helicopter, and one light/attack

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helicopter squadron.

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�� Statement of the Problem

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�� The 1985-1989 Five Year Defense Plan Guidance, in an

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effort to ensure a credible amphibious warfare capability,

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established a requirement to simultaneously lift the assault

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echelons of a MEF and of a MEB (17-i).� To lift the assault

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echelon of a MEF today would require all of the amphibious

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assets in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets.� However,

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each Fleet does have sufficient assets to lift the assault

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echelon of a MEB.� Thus, the largest combat force with which

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the Marine Corps could conduct a timely amphibious assault in

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either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet is a Marine

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Expeditionary Brigade.� As a result of this amphibious lift

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constraint, the Marine Corps has debated the dilemma of

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deploying as a MEB and employing as a MEF, or as it has been

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called, the composite MEF.

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�� Compounding this dilemma are other factors affecting the

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way the Marine Corps is organized and trained for combat.� One

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of the most significant is the anticipated reduction in the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Corps budget for the next several years.� Less money

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

necessitates decreased manpower and decreased training

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

expenses.� At the same time, the theater commanders-in-chief

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

have levied requirements on the Marine Corps for increased

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

joint service planning and increased responsiveness to the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

call for deployment.� Lastly, the Marine Corps has adopted a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

new warfighting philosophy to enable it to win outnumbered on

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

any battlefield in the future.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

incompatible with the resolution to these problems.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

leads to four problems:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 1.� Efficiency in responding to the call of the theater

commanders-in-chief.

�� 2.� Synchronization with our view of the foreseeable future

�� 3.� Implementation of our maneuver warfare philosophy.

�� 4.� Wasteful use of scarce manpower assets.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� In order to improve the responsiveness of a MAGTF to the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

call of a theater commander-in-chief, the Commandant of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Corps approved in 1983 the permanent MAGTF headquarters

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

concept.� Two specific concerns that formed the basis for this

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

were increased emphasis on rapid deployment of MAGTF's and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

increased joint service planning commitments requiring

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

operational data from MAGTF's.� This emphasis on rapid

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

deployment can not be overstated.� The theater commanders-in-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

chief require a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to be ready for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

embarkation within four days of notification and a MEF within

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ten days of notification (23,24,25,26).� Although the object

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept was to eliminate

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

`ad-hocery' in time of crisis," it does not do so for the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat elements of the MAGTF.� Except for the case of the MEF,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the ground combat element must be task organized by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reinforcing an infantry unit with combat arms units

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(artillery, combat engineer, light armored infantry,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reconnaissance, and tank) from the division.� The aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat element must be task organized to perform all six

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

functions of Marine aviation.� This will require the task

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organization of units from at least six different Groups.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat service support element must also task organize units

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from eight different battalions.� The permanent MAGTF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters concept only eliminates "ad-hocery" within the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MAGTF command element which represents approximately 5% of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

personnel strength of the MAGTF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This "ad-hocery" not only exists to form the MAGTF, but

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

also to employ it in combat.� Under the composite MAGTF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

concept, Marine Corps forces will deploy to a conflict as a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB and employ in combat as a MEF.� Employment as a MEF will

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

necessitate bringing the MEF, division, wing, and FSSG

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters into the theater as soon as possible, or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

designating some smaller unit as a "forward" headquarters.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Shortly after these "forward" headquarters are established,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the appropriate elements of the MAGTF will shift from the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command of the MEB to the command of the "forward"

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters.�� n the case of the MAGTF command elements,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one MEB headquarters is designated as the "forward leaning"

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB, the first to deploy.� The other MEB command element is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

embedded in the MEF headquarters to ensure that the MEF and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB staffs are equally proficient in joint coordination with

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the theater commanders-in-chief.� However, the first MEB

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command element to deploy is the one that has not had the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

experience working with the commander-in-chief.� To

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

rectify that problem, a portion of the MEF command element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will fly into the theater of conflict as soon as possible

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and merge with the "forward leaning" MEB command element.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

As a result, the MEF command element is composed of parts

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of two different staffs who have not worked together.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

division, wing, and FSSG headquarters�� The MAGTF Master

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Plan was developed in 1989 to establish the "operational

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

foundation for the organization, manning, equipping,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

training, and development of doctrine and operational

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

techniques for MAGTF's through the year 2000" (4-1.1).� In

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

fulfilling this charter, the MAGTF Master Plan predicts the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

types of operations that MAGTFs will execute in the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

foreseeable future (4-5.1).� The most common employments

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for a MAGTF are stability operations and limited objective

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

operations.� The probability of employment of a MAGTF in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

conventional operations short of general war can be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

described as only "may" occur during the next twenty years.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

"General war is the armed conflict between major powers, in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

which the total resources of the belligerents are employed

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and the national survival of a major belligerent is in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

jeopardy" (4-5.7).� The United States has been involved in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

two, and perhaps three, general wars in over 200 years--the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II.� Thus,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the least likely employment for a MAGTF is in a general

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

war.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The Haynes Board attempted to "develop alternative force

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

structures, concepts of employment, and disposition and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

deployment of Marine Corps forces through 1985" (12).� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

study concluded that our current organization of division-wing

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

teams is best suited for general war, but that an organization

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

based on Marine Expeditionary Brigades is best suited for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

stability and limited objective operations.� The study also

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

advocated that retaining the division-wing organization would

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

prevent infatuation with low intensity conflict mission and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

avoid a commando mentality complex.� However, the MAGTF Master

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Plan states that MAGTF's must be prepared to perform commando

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

type mission such as "port and airfield seizures", "recovery

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of downed aircraft, equipment, and personnel through

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

clandestine insertion of forces",� "in-extremis hostage rescue

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

operations", and "counterterrorist operations" (5-5.3).� Thus,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the current organization inhibits preparation for and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

execution of the very missions for which a MAGTF is most

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

likely to be employed.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The Marine Corps has adopted a maneuver warfare

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

philosophy as its basic warfighting doctrine.� This philosophy

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

holds that decentralized command is necessary to cope with the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat and to develop

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the tempo of operations that we desire.� Decentralized command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

means that subordinates may make their own decisions based on

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

their understanding of their superior's intent.� The ability

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for seniors and subordinates to communicate through mutual

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

understanding and anticipating each other's thoughts is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

essential for success under this doctrine.� This implicit

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

communication is based on a shared philosophy and experience

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

which can only be developed through the familiarity and trust

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that arises from established, long-term working relationships.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The current organization detracts from the establishment

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of these habitual relationships.� The "ad-hocery" necessary to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

task organize the ground combat, the aviation combat, and the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat service support elements prevents long-term, working

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

relationships between the commanders and their staffs.� Yet,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

it is in these very units that this decentralized command must

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

be exercised.� A concern for the impact of constant turmoil on

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the professional competence of the MAGTF headquarters staff

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

led to the decision to approve the permanent MAGTF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters concept (22).� Constant turmoil should have the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

same effect on the professional competence of the staff of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

each subordinate element of the MAGTF as it does on the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

professional competence of the headquarters staff.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Not only does our current "ad-hocery" prevent long-term,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

working relationships between the MAGTF commander and his

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

staff, but also between the MAGTF commander and his

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

subordinate commanders.� Currently, forces are only designated

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for employment with a particular MAGTF.� Forces are assigned

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to the parent division, wing, or FSSG and are subject to that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

parent's commands.� Thus, it is possible that a designated

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

unit may be assigned a mission by its parent commander

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

rendering it unavailable for employment with the MAGTF.� For

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

example, units participating in a Combined Arms Exercise at 29

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Palms, California, as directed by their parent division or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wing, would not be able to meet the embarkation response time

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

required by the theater commanders-in-chief.� Thus, a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

substitute unit would be deployed into combat without

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the habitual relationships between commanders that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

our warfighting doctrine deems necessary for success.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This unity of command issue has even greater significance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

when considering the current practice of "dual hatting"

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Commanding Generals.� The Commanding General, Fleet Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Force, Atlantic, is also the Commanding General, II MEF.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Commanding Generals of the 1st and the 3rd Marine Divisions

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are also the Commanding Generals of I and III MEF,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

respectively.� Compounding the problem in III MEF is the fact

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that the Assistant Division Commander is dual hatted as the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Commanding General of 9th MEB.� Under our current concept of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

deployment as a MEB and employment as a MEF, the MEF command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

element falls in on the MEB command element.� During that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

period when the MEB is being composited to a MEF, the question

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of who is commanding the Marine Division is not merely an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

academic issue.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The Haynes Board, long before our warfighting doctrine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

was published, espoused some of its basic tenets.� According

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to the Board, although a division-wing organization provided

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

flexibility, an organization built around brigades supported

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the air-ground concept and enhanced training as an integrated

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combined arms team.� In summation, the Board stated that only

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a combined arms team will win on the future battlefield (12).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

characterized by redundant headquarters.� There are MEB

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command elements which will probably be called upon to command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the brigade during its initial, rapid deployment into the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

theater of conflict. There are the MEF command elements that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

exercise command over all the major subordinate commands.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Lastly, there are the major subordinate commands (division,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wing, FSSG) that are, according to the Haynes Board, ideally

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

suited for combat in the least likely level of conflict.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Both the Haynes Board and the Hogaboom Board (3)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

recognized the concern for personnel and fiscal constraint.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

The Hogaboom Board reported that "although the current

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

manpower availability was not the guiding or overriding

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

consideration" in their efforts to determine the organization

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and composition of the Fleet Marine Forces beginning in 1958,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Board did keep in mind "the practical background fact

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that, in an era of rising military costs and limited personnel

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

availability, great weight must be given to the goal of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

accomplishing more with less" (3).� The Haynes Board also

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

addressed the personnel constraint issue. The Board concluded

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that a brigade organization is effective when forced to reduce

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

personnel structure due to fiscal constraint.� The Board went

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

on to say that 196,000 Marines are insufficient to support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three divisions and three aircraft wings.� (On 30 September

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

1988, the personnel strength of the Marine Corps was 197,195

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marines.) The Haynes Board did, however, identify the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

strongest argument for retention of the division-wing

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organization.� Section 5013, Title 10, United States Code

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

states that the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

include not less that three combat divisions and three air

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wings..." (2-606).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Statement of the Proposal

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� To resolve the problems arising out of the existing

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organization and to prepare for the 21st century, the Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Corps should reorganize the Fleet Marine Forces.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reorganization should include three elements:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� l.� Permanently establish Marine Expeditionary Brigades

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

as the only major subordinate command of Marine Expeditionary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Forces.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 2.� Integrate a reserve, mobilization Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Expeditionary Brigade into two of the active Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Expeditionary Forces.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 3.� Transfer the manpower structure of superfluous

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command elements to that of necessary combat elements.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Under this proposal, I and II MEF would have two active

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

duty MEB's, one mobilization MEB, and three MEU's.� II MEF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would just two active duty MEB's.� In each of the MEF's, one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB would fulfill the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mission while the other MEB would fulfill the amphibious

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assault mission.� The mobilization MEB would be manned by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Selected Marine Corps Reserve units.� All MEB's and MEU's

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would have permanently assigned forces.� Each MEF would also

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

have a Force Troops unit.� Within the context of this

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

proposal, Force Troops is not a major subordinate command as

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in days of old, but merely a collective title for units not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned to a MEB.� Each MEF would retain its geographical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

orientation:� II MEF - Europe, III MEF - Asia, and I MEF -

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

global reserve.� Figures 13 and 14 depict the proposed

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organizational charts for I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and III Marine Expeditionary Force, respectively.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Forces would be assigned, as opposed to designated, to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the amphibious MEB and to the MPF MEB.� All assigned forces

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would come under the command and control of the Brigade

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Commanding General.� The existing tables of organization for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

maritime prepositioning force (T/O 1001) and amphibious (T/O

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

1002) brigades form the basis for manning these standing

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

brigades.� Figures 15 and 16 depict the subordinate units of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the ground combat element, aviation combat element, combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

service support element, and command element of the amphibious

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and maritime prepositioning force brigades, respectively.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The ground combat element in both brigades is a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

regimental landing team.� The regimental landing team is task

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organized to include an infantry regiment, a direct support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

artillery battalion, and two general support (self propelled)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

artillery batteries, two assault amphibian companies, one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat engineer company, one light armored infantry company,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one reconnaissance company, two tank companies, and an anti-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

tank platoon.� The headquarters and service company of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

infantry regiment has also been task organized to include a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

military police platoon, a communications platoon, a service

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

platoon, a radar beacon team, and a SCAMP (Sensor Control and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Management Platoon) sensor employment squad.� These

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

small units formerly were assigned to the headquarters

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion of the Marine division.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The aviation combat element is a Marine Aircraft Group

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(MAG) that is task organized to perform the six functions of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine aviation.� To accomplish this, the MAG has four

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons, and four fixed wing squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

permanently assigned.� Whenever the brigade is deployed or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

employed, a detachment from each of the Force Troops squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would be assigned to the brigade, as necessary.� In addition

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to the flying squadrons, the MAG has two Marine Wing Support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Squadrons which permit flight operations at two expeditionary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

airfields.� To ensure control of aircraft and missiles, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MAG also has a Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) and a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battery each from the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Battalion and from the Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Battalion.� The Marine Air Control Squadron is reorganized

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with assets from other Control Group squadrons.� From the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron, MACS assumed the assets

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and responsibility to provide air traffic control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

simultaneously to two independent and geographically separated

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

expeditionary airfields and three remote area landing sites.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Air Support Squadron transferred the assets and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

responsibility to operate a direct air support center and an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

air support radar team.� From Marine Wing Communications

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Squadron, MACS received a comm squadron detachment.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the Marine Air

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Control Group provided the assets for MACS to operate a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Tactical Air Command Center.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) is a task

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organized to provide autonomous support.� The BSSG is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organized into eight companies that mirror the battalion

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

structure of the Force Service Support Group.� Figure 19

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

depicts the proposed structure of a BSSG.� The Headquarters

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and Service Company would provide the BSSG command element, a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

communications platoon, a military police platoon, and a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

service platoon.� The Supply company would consist of a supply

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

platoon, a ration platoon, a medical logistics platoon, and an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ammunition platoon.� The Maintenance Company has ordnance,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

motor transport, engineer, electronic, and general support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

maintenance platoons.� The BSSG would also have one Motor

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Transport Company and one Landing Support company augmented by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a Beach and Port platoon.� Medical services would be provided

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

by a Dental Company and a new Medical company consisting of an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

existing Casualty and Clearing Company and a Surgical Support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

platoon.� Engineer support would be provided by a Bulk Fuel

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Company and by an Engineer Company augmented by an Engineer

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Support platoon and a Bridge platoon.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� In I MEF and II MEF, three standing Marine Expeditionary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Units (MEU) would be structured according to their existing

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

standardized troop lists (29).� Each MEU is composed of a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion landing team, a composite helicopter squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(CH-46, CH-53, AH-1, UH-1, and AV-8), a MEU Service

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Support Group, and a MEU command element.� The three

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

composite squadrons are supported by the assets from

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three medium helicopter squadrons (HMM), one light/attack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadron (HMLA), one heavy helicopter squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(HMH), and one attack squadron (VMA).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The reserve mobilization MEB has significantly greater

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ground combat power than either the amphibious or the MPF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB's.� Figure 17 depicts the subordinate units of the ground

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat element, the aviation combat element, the combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

service support element, and the command element of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reserve mobilization brigade.� This MEB has a direct support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

artillery battalion (M1l4 &nd M198 howitzers), a general

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support artillery battalion (M198 howitzers), a general

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support (self propelled) artillery battalion (M109 and Mll0

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

howitzers), and an additional general support (self

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

propelled) artillery battery instead of just a direct

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support artillery battalion, and two general support (self

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

propelled) artillery batteries (M109 and Mll0 howitzers).� the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilization MEB has significantly more artillery support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

since the general support artillery battalions were removed

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from the active duty forces and placed in the reserve forces

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

as part of the Commandant's combat readiness enhancements.� It

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

also has an additional combat engineer company and, even more

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

significantly, a tank battalion vice just two tank companies.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

The aviation combat element (ACE), unlike the ACE of other

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB's, has a VMGR squadron (KC-130).� The reserve BSSG has the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

same capabilities as the BSSG for the MPF MEB.� However, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command element of the reserve mobilization brigade does not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

have a Radio Company but does have a full Air Naval Gunfire

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Liaison Company (ANGLICO), a full Force Reconnaissance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Company, and a full Civil Affairs Group.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Force Troops consists of the MEF Command Element, a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Support Regiment, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Service

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Regiment.� Each of these regiments and the Group consist of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one- of-a-kind units that have not been assigned to a brigade.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The third element of this proposal is to transfer the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

manpower structure of superfluous command elements to that of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

necessary combat units.� This excess structure would be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

created by the elimination of 29 units within each MEF.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command elements of the following units would be abolished:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

DIVISION�� WING� �� FSSG

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Division HQ �� Wing HQ�� H&S Co, H&S Bn

HQ Co, HQ Bn�� MWHS� �� H&S Co, MT Bn

Svc Co, H&S Bn�� MAG HQ�� H&S Co, Engr Spt Bn

HQ Co, Inf Regt� �� MALS� �� H&S Co, Maint Bn

HQ Bty, Art Regt� �� H&HS, MACG�� H&S Co, Med Bn

H&S Co, AA Bn�� H&HS, MWSG�� H&S Co, Den Bn

H&S Co, CE Bn�� MATCS �� H&S Co, Ldg Spt Bn

H&S Co, LAI Bn�� MWCS� �� H&S Co, Sup Bn

H&S Co, Recon Bn�� MASS� ��

H&S Co,Tk�� LAAD Bn

�� LAAM Bn

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

It bears repeating that only the command element of these units

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will be eliminated.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� CHAPTER II

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� ANALYSIS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Impact on the Ground Combat Element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Adoption of this proposal will have five fundamental

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

impacts on the ground combat element:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 1.� Reduction� in� the� number� of� infantry� battalions

assigned to the MEU (SOC) mission.

�� 2.� Elimination of numerous commands.

�� 3.� Military occupational specialty (MOS) progression.

�� 4.� Employment of the Reserves.

�� 5.� Combat power of the ground combat element.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

The impacts are neither inherently good nor inherently bad,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

but are simply consequences that may or may not be maximized

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for the future good of the Marine Corps.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� One of the most obvious impacts of this proposal on the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ground combat element is the reduction in the number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

infantry battalions assigned to the MEU (SOC) mission.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Currently, there are four battalions each, in I and II MEF,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that serve in sequence with three MEU command elements.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

pairing of four battalions with three MEU command elements

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

guarantees that any specific battalion will serve with the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

same MEU command element only once in five-and-a-half years.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

However, FMFM 1, the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine, states

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that habitual relationships facilitate implicit communication,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

which is essential for success when employing the maneuver

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

warfare philosophy (16-63).� To improve these habitual

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

relationships, this proposal permanently assigns three

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion landing teams within I and II MEF to three MEU

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command elements.� The fourth battalion landing team is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned to a regimental landing team that comprises the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ground combat element of one of the MEB's.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Without a doubt, the most controversial issue raised by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

this proposal is the elimination of numerous commands.� Within

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

each MEF the Marine division, the artillery regiment, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

amphibious assault battalion, the combat engineer battalion,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the light armored infantry battalion, the reconnaissance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion, the tank battalion, and the division headquarters

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion would all be disbanded.� This action is primarily

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aimed at the headquarters elements of these units.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

proposal assigns all of the subordinate elements of these

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

units to the Commanding General of each Marine Expeditionary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Brigade.� Thus, there are no subordinate units for the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

division, artillery regiment, or independent battalion

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters to command and control.� Since there are no

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

subordinate units for them to command and control, it follows

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that there is no need for those headquarters.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� In addition to disbanding the division, the artillery

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

regiment, and the six independent battalion headquarters,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three infantry regimental headquarters would also be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

disbanded, one from each MEF.� In I and II MEF, three infantry

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalions are permanently assigned to the three MEU command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

elements.� Since the MEU command element provides permanent

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command and control, there is no reason for the existence of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the parent infantry regiment.� In matters of concern between

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the battalions of adjacent MEU's, the MEB command element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would provide the coordinating instructions.� Thus, even in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that minor role, there is no need for the regimental

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters.� In III MEF, one of the two regiments on Okinawa

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would be disbanded.� This proposal assigns one regimental

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

landing team to the amphibious MEB and the MPF MEB in each

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEF.� Thus, the requirement for regimental headquarters is two

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

per MEF.� However, in III MEF there are three regimental

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters--two in Okinawa and one in Hawaii.� The MEB in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Hawaii is assigned the MPF mission while the MEB in Okinawa is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned the amphibious mission.� Since there is but one MEB

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in Okinawa, there is need for but one regimental headquarters

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

there.� To eliminate superfluous units, one regiment in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Okinawa should be disbanded.� Two consequences of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

elimination of the artillery regiment, and the independent

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion headquarters are the lack of command opportunities

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and the lack of MOS progression for officers.� Traditionally,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the artillery regiment is commanded by a colonel with a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

secondary MOS of 0802.� The assault amphibian, the combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

engineer, and the tank battalions are traditionally commanded

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

by lieutenant colonels with primary MOS's of 1803, 1302, and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

1802, respectively.� However, under this proposal, the ground

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat element is comprised of one regimental landing team

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with three infantry battalions, one direct support artillery

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion, two general support artillery batteries, and one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

company each of amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tanks.� Thus, in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

each regimental landing team there is just one battalion

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command and four battery command opportunities for officers

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with a primary MOS of 0802, and just one company command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

opportunity for officers with primary MOS's of 1302, 1802, or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

1803.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Under the current system, officers with primary MOS's of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

0802, 1302, 1802, and 1803 progress in MOS development by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

service in companies or batteries as company grade officers,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

service on battalion staffs as majors, and service as

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion commanding officers as lieutenant colonels.� Field

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

grade artillery officers have the additional opportunity for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MOS development with service on the artillery regimental

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

staff.� However, with the elimination of the artillery

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

regiment and the independent battalion headquarters, field

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

grade officers will not have these opportunities for MOS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

development.� Additionally, without the independent battalions

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

there will not be a readily available pool of mentors to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

instruct company grade officers and advise the ground combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

element commander on the most advantageous method of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

employment of the organic combat support assets--artillery,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers, light armored

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

infantry, reconnaissance teams, and tanks.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The first problem can be addressed in a candid manner.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Although it is unfortunate that the number of commands is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reduced, it is not the mission of the Marine Corps to provide

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command opportunities for all of its officers.� The Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Corps exists to conduct land warfare as a part of naval

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

campaigns in support of our national objectives.� Officer

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assignments are made to meet the needs of the Corps.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� For the second problem, the issue really becomes one of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ensuring that experts are available to advise the ground

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat commander on the integration of the infantry and the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat support units.� These experts would be available to the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commander under this proposal.� Advisors to the commander

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would be found on the commander's staff and not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

necessarily in the combat support unit.� Military

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

occupational specialty developmental progress for combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support officers would be by service in companies and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

batteries where tactical employment would be taught by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the company commander.� As the combat support officers

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

progressed in rank, they would serve on various MAGTF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command element staffs where they would learn combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support integration.� The next command billet they might

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

attain would be the ground combat element commander.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

There is no compelling reason why an officer with a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat support background should not aspire to command of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a battalion landing team or a regimental landing team.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

These landing teams are much more than an infantry

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion or regiment with some supporting arms.� They

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are combined arms teams of artillery, amphibious assault

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

vehicles, infantry and light armored infantry,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reconnaissance teams, tanks, and combat engineers.� Tbe

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

background of the commander should reflect the same.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Under this proposal, I and II MEF each have one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilization MEB which is composed entirely of units from the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR).� The Marine Corps

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Reserve is "charged with providing the means for rapid

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

expansion of our Corps during a national emergency" (16-5.7).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

This rapid expansion is achieved by augmenting the active duty

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

units with personnel replacements from the Individual Ready

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Reserve and by reinforcing active duty units with additional

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

units from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.� Prior to this

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

proposal, the reinforcing units from the SMCR were envisioned

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to be no larger than a battalion or a squadron.� The SMCR has

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

sufficient units to field the ground combat element of two

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB's (10-8.6).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Assignment of a mobilization MEB to I and II MEF resolves

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a critical problem during employment of those MEF's.� Of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

twelve infantry battalions assigned to I MEF, two are always

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

deployed to III MEF on the unit deployment program, one is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

always forward deployed with a MEU (SOC), and one is in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

training to replace the forward deployed MEU (SOC) battalion.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Thus, at any time, three, and most likely four, infantry

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalions are unavailable, leaving just eight battalions to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

be employed with the MEF.� In II MEF, the situation is even

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

more critical.� Of the nine battalions assigned, one is always

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

forward deployed as part of the Landing Force Sixth Fleet, one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

is in training to replace the forward deployed battalion, and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one is always deployed to III MEF on the unit deployment

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

program.� Thus at any time, three battalions are unavailable,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

leaving just six battalions to be employed with the MEF.� III

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEF is similarly strapped with only six infantry battalions--

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

two in Hawaii and four on Okinawa.� Assigning a reserve,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilization MEB to I and II MEF guarantees each MEF of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

conceptual minimum employment of nine infantry battalions.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

This guarantee is not without cost.� In order to employ the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reserve MEB, the Congress must order a national

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilization or the President must execute his authority to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilize up to 200,000 reservists without a national

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilization.� Although both of these actions are fraught with

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

political liability for the President, it does ensure that a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Expeditionary Force is not committed to combat without

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the support of the nation.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The final major issue concerning the ground combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

element is the credibility of its combat power.� The degree to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

which a military unit represents a credible force is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

determined by the capabilities of its opposition.� A Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Expeditionary Brigade, with its regimental landing team,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine aircraft group, and brigade service support group, is a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

credible force immediately on arrival in a low-intensity or mid-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

intensity conflict.� Clearly, for sustained, land operations

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in a high-intensity conflict, a Marine Expeditionary Force,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with its much greater ground combat power, air power, and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

sustainability, is required.� One aspect of the ground combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

power of the MEF that is addressed by this proposal but not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

our existing organization is the availability of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalions assigned to the activated Marine Expeditionary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Units.� The forward deployed MEU's are under the operational

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

control of the theater Commanders-in-Chief.� As such, MEF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

planners can not assume that the subordinate units of the MEU

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will be available if the MEF is deployed for some contingency.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

This proposal guarantees greater combat power for the MEF by

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigning to it a reserve, mobilization MEB.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Impact on the Aviation Combat Element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Adoption of this proposal will have five fundamental

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

impacts on the aviation combat element:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 1.� Realignment of squadrons within each Marine Aircraft

Group.

�� 2.� Availability of squadron assets.

�� 3.� Revised concept of employment for the Marine Aviation

Logistics Squadron.

�� 4.� Elimination of numerous commands.

�� 5.� Revised concept of employment for the Marine Air

Command and Control System.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The most obvious impact of this proposal is the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

realignment of squadrons within the Marine Aircraft Group

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(MAG).� This proposal would realign the composition of each

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

NAG from one along functional lines to one that ensures the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

capability to provide all six functions of Marine aviation.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

This realignment will require some units to relocate, but only

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to the extent required to obtain the proper distribution of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons within a theater.� Lastly, the realignment will

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

provide the MAG headquarters staff with the necessary training

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for the MAG to fulfill its mission as the aviation combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

element of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Currently MAG's are organized along functional lines--

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

control groups, support groups, helicopter groups, fighter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

groups, and attack groups.� This proposal would "mirror image"

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

all the MAG's that are assigned as the aviation combat element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of a MEB.� Each of these Groups would have two (one for MPF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MAG's) medium helicopter squadrons (HMM) flying the V-22, one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

heavy helicopter squadron (HMH) flying the CH-53E, one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

light/attack helicopter squadron (HMLA) flying the UH-1 and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the AH-1, two fighter/attack squadrons (VMFA) flying the F/A-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

18, one attack squadron (VMA) flying the AV-8, and one all-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

weather attack squadron (VMA(AW)) flying the A-6.� In addition

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to the flying squadrons, each MAG would have one aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

logistics squadron (MALS), two support squadrons (MWSS), one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

substantially reinforced air control squadron (MACS), a low

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

altitude air defense (LAAD) battery, and a light anti-aircraft

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

missile (LAAM) battery.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� In addition to the realignment of the MAG's assigned to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the amphibious and the maritime prepositioning force brigades,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

six other squadrons in I and II MEF would be permanently

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aligned with a Marine Expeditionary Unit.� Three medium

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

light/attack helicopter squadron, one attack squadron, and one

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

low altitude air defense platoon are required to fulfill the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

standardized troop lists of three MEU's (28).� One medium

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadron and one-third of the assets, including

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

intermediate support, of each of the other squadrons would be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned to each of the MEU's.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Each Force Troops of each MEF would also have a MAG.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

This Group would have an aerial refueler transport squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(VMGR) flying the KC-130, and an observation squadron (VMO)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

flying the OV-10.� The Force Troops MAG in II MEF would have a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

tactical electronic warfare squadron (VMAQ) flying the EA-6,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

while the Force Troops in I MEF would have a tactical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reconnaissance squadron (VMFP) flying the F/A-18.� Each of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

these squadrons is capable of employing detachments to support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

either of the two brigades or any of the MEU's.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� With the realignment of squadrons within each MAG there

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will also be some relocation of squadrons.� This proposal does

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

not require that all units of a particular Group are

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

garrisoned at the same air station.� The only requirement is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that all units assigned to any particular Group must be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

located within the same theater.� Within I and II MEF,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons would remain garrisoned at their current air

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

stations.� Within III MEF some squadrons must be relocated

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from Hawaii to Okinawa.� Table 1 illustrates the current, on-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

hand distribution (O/H), proposed distribution of flying squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

among the three MEF's (REQR) and the total number of squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

specified by the Aviation Master Plan (PLAN).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Only eleven flying squadrons would have to be relocated--

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

eight squadrons between the MEF's and three within III MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Any plan that proposes to relocate additional squadrons to a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

foreign country must consider the impact on the established

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

balance of forces.� This plan would increase the number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� TABLE 1

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� FLYING SQUADRON DISTRIBUTION

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� I MEF II MEF�� III MEF�� TOTAL

SQDN� �� O/H�� REQR�� O/H�� REQR�� O/H�� REQR�� O/H�� PLAN�� REQR

HMM�� 5�� 6�� 6�� 6�� 4�� 3�� 15�� 18�� 15

HMH�� 5�� 3�� 3�� 3�� 1�� 2�� 9�� 6�� 8

HMLA� �� 4�� 3�� 2�� 3�� 0�� 2�� 6�� 8�� 8

VMFA� �� 3�� 4�� 6�� 4�� 3�� 4�� 12�� 12�� 12

VMA�� 4�� 3�� 4�� 3�� 0�� 2�� 8�� 8 �� 8

VMA (AW)�� 2�� 2�� 3�� 2�� 0�� 2�� 5�� 5�� 6

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

flying squadrons on Okinawa by one medium helicopter squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

relocated from Hawaii.� This increase would be offset by a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

decrease of two support squadrons relocated from Okinawa to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Hawaii.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Once the squadrons are properly distributed throughout

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the MEF's, the Groups will face a serious span of control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

problem.� A MAG headquarters in I or II MEF will have its

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

subordinate squadrons spread across three air stations located

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

hundreds of miles apart.� The MAG in Okinawa will have its

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons spread between Futenma and Iwakuni.� Although this

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

is not the ideal basing plan, it is no different from that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

which is intended whenever a MAGTF is employed.� Rotary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wing and fixed wing aircraft will not be based at the same

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

airfield.� The range and response time of rotary wing aircraft

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are such that it requires them to be forward based.� Fixed

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wing aircraft have much quicker response time and can,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

therefore, operate effectively from an air base safely

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ensconced in the rear area.� It is during peacetime that we

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are enjoined to prepare for war (14-41).� Thus it is logical,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

hence appropriate, that a MAG headquarters must, in peacetime,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

contend with the same span of control problem it will face in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� After implementing this realignment, the MAG will avoid

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the "ad hocery in crisis" that the Commandant decried (18).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

When a MEB is deployed for combat, the MAG that forms its

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aviation combat element will be far more ready than our Groups

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

today.� The realigned MAG is, following the advice of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Commandant (22), task organized for the "most likely

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

contingency."� Clearly, the MEF commander can still refine the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

task organization with units from Force Troops or from the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

sister brigade.� The vast majority of the subordinate squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commanders will have established the long-term working

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

relationships with their group commander necessary to develop

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

familiarity and trust, which are essential to our doctrine of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

maneuver warfare (14-63).� Not only have the squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commanders developed these habitual relationships, the MAG

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters staff has also developed long-term working

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

relationships.� The Group staff is well prepared to execute

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

all six functions of Marine aviation since it does so in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

peacetime with its permanently assigned assets.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� A critical factor in the viability of this plan is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

whether sufficient assets exist to allow them to be allocated

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to each brigade.� When insufficient assets exist to meet all

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

requirements simultaneously, it is prudent to hold all assets

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

as general purpose forces.� Such is the case in this proposal

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with the squadrons that have been assigned to Force Troops.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Excesses and shortages in the number of squadrons required to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

execute this plan must be referenced to the number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons envisioned in 2001 by the Aviation Master Plan.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The Aviation Master Plan envisions a change in the number

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of each type of helicopter squadron and an increase in the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

number of observation and of tactical reconnaissance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons.� The number of medium helicopter squadrons will

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

increase from 15 to 18 with the conversion from the H-46 to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the V-22.� This will be accomplished by changing three heavy

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons to medium squadrons with their conversion

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from the H-53D to the V-22. Three more heavy helicopter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons will exchange their H-53D aircraft for the H-53E.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

This change will bring the total number of heavy helicopter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons, flying the CH-53E, to six.� The number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

light/attack helicopter squadrons will increase from six to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

eight with the introduction of the AH-1W.� The number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

observation squadrons will increase from two to three.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

number of tactical reconnaissance squadrons will increase from

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one to three with the conversion from the RF-4 to the F/A-18.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� On the SMCR side of the aviation plan, almost every

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aircraft community will change either number of squadrons or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

type of aircraft.� Both medium helicopter squadrons and the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

only heavy helicopter squadron will convert from the H-46 and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the H-53D to the V-22.� In the process of the conversion, four

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons will emerge from the three. �All three light

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons (HML) and the only attack helicopter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadron (HMA) will merge to form two light/attack helicopter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons (HMLA).� All three fighter/attack and all five

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

attack squadrons will convert from the F-4 and the A-4 to the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

F/A-18 and the AV-8.� They will emerge from the conversion as

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

four VMFA and two VMA squadrons.� One additional VMGR squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

has joined the SMCR.� Finally, the VMFP squadron will exchange

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

its RF-4 for the F/A-18D.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Table 2 illustrates the flying squadron requirements,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

active duty and reserve, for the Aviation Master Plan and for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

this plan.� The only inconsistencies between this proposal and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Master Plan are with the HMH and VMA(AW) squadrons, active

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and reserve, the active HMM squadrons, and the reserve VMO,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

VMAQ, and VMFP squadrons.� An examination of these communities

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will reveal the rationale for these differences.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This proposal established a requirement for 15 medium

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons based on the current inventory of medium

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons.� The V-22 has a greater range and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

quicker response time than the H-46.� Hence, it is illogical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that with the introduction of a more capable aircraft the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Corps would need more medium lift squadrons flying that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aircraft.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The heavy lift requirement has shifted from the H-53D to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the H-53E.� The Aviation Master Plan envisions six heavy lift

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadrons, sufficient assets for one per MEB.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

However, that plan ignores the requirement for the assets of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one squadron to support the three MEU's on each coast.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

current acquisition strategy for the H-53E is for a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

procurement of 105 aircraft through the end of 1991 to support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

six operational squadrons and one training squadron.� However,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a total procurement of 191 aircraft is required to meet the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Corps heavy lift requirements into the next century

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(16-3.23).� This additional procurement will be sufficient,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

baring an increase in aircraft attrition, to rectify the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

shortages in the number of HMH squadrons in both the active

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

duty and the reserve forces.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This proposal requires an all-weather attack capability

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in each MEB--amphibious, MPF, and reserve mobilization.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

capability is performed by A-6 squadrons.� However, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Click here to view image

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

current inventory and the planned inventory of these squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

is not sufficient to provide one squadron per MEB.� As shown

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in Table 2, the Marine Corps has only five A-6 squadrons.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Throughout the aviation community there is an unspoken

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reluctance to increase the number of A-6 squadrons, regardless

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of need, due to its relatively slow speed, wing design

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

problems, and near equivalent capabilities of more modern

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aircraft.� Although the A-6 is eminently capable of fulfilling

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

its all-weather role with a substantial weapons load, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

economic realities of reopening a production line for an aircraft

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that has some significant shortcomings dominate the decision not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to increase the number of A-6 squadrons.� However, at the start

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the next century, the Marine Corps needs an all-weather attack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

capability for each of its expeditionary brigades.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

capability may be met by acquisition of a new aircraft (highly

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

unlikely given the coming austere budgets and historical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

acquisition time), or by modification of an existing aircraft.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The Aviation Master Plan envisions a SMCR with one VMO,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one VMAQ, and one VMFP squadron.� This proposal lists those

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons as excess.� The concept of employment of the VMO,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and the VMGR squadrons are as MEF assets.� However, there is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

no plan to employ the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Aircraft Wing and the 4th Force Service Support Group as a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEF.� The VMAQ squadron, in addition to being a MEF asset,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

is generally considered to be a national asset.� A reserve

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mobilization MEB has no need for these squadrons.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB can not be employed without a Presidential "200,000

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

call-up" or a national mobilization.� In either case, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

conflict has escalated from low-intensity or mid-intensity

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

conflict to high-intensity conflict.� Thus, the full

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

capabilities of the MEF to perform these missions are

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

presumably already in the theater of conflict.� The needs

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the Marine Corps would be better served by transferring

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the physical assets of these squadrons to the active

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

forces.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The concept of employment of the Marine Aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Logistics Squadron (MALS) must be revised for the effective

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

implementation of this proposal.� Recently, the Marine Corps

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

adopted the MALS concept.� Under this, the Group headquarters

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

portion of the old Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(HAMS) was removed and designated simply as the MAG

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters.� The "and Maintenance" portion of the HAMS was

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

redesignated as the MALS.� This redesignation is only somewhat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

more appropriate since the "and Maintenance" portion not only

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

included the intermediate maintenance functions, but also the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aviation supply function.� With the exception of aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

intermediate maintenance and aviation supply, the functions of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine aviation logistics are really performed by the Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Wing Support Squadron.� Each aircraft group was, nevertheless,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned a MALS.� The concept of employment of the MALS is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

evident from the amphibious and the maritime prepositioning

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

force brigade tables of organization (11). A fixed wing and a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

rotary wing MALS is to be assigned to each brigade.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Since each MALS has only the personnel and equipment to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

provide intermediate maintenance for the aircraft assigned to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the parent aircraft group, the concept of contingency support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

packages evolved.� A contingency support package (CSP)

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

consists of the people, parts, equipment, and mobile

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

maintenance facilities necessary to support the aircraft

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned for the mission.� The contingency support package is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

developed by adding a deployment CSP (DCSP) and a fly-in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support package (FISP) to a core or common CSP.� The common

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

CSP is one that is universally applicable to all Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

fixed wing or to all rotary wing aircraft.� The deployment CSP

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

is composed of the support items unique to any particular

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aircraft.� The people required for the deployment CSP are

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

listed on each squadron's table of organization as "MALS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

augment."� The equipment for the deployment CSP comes from a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

pro rata share of the old HAMS equipment.� The fly-in support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

package is a ten day supply of organizational level parts that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the flying squadron normally takes on the flight ferry.� Under

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

this concept, each MALS would support the aircraft that were

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

collocated with it.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This proposal assigns but one MALS to each MAG and none

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for the squadrons assigned to a MEU.� For the latter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons, the ship's Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Department (AIMD) provides the common CSP, while each squadron

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

must provide its own deployment CSP.� When deployed, the MALS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

provides the common CSP and each squadron provides its

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

deployed CSP.� Under the current concept of employment, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

flying squadrons and their parent MALS are all collocated with

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the MAG headquarters.� Under this proposal, they are not, for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

it is quite conceivable that a MAG headquarters and its

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

associated MALS will have assigned squadrons spread among

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three air stations.� At least one of those three air stations

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will not have a MALS garrisoned there.� The issue then becomes

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one of now having organized the MALS for warfighting, how is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

it adapted for peacetime?

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� A solution to the problem can be obtained from the Navy.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Each air station that garrisons a significant number of flying

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons would establish an aircraft intermediate maintenance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

department. �The common CSP from the former HAMS and the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

deployment CSP's from the squadron would be assigned to the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

AIMD as category I augmentees under the Fleet Assistance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Program.� Essentially, all the production capability of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MALS would be "fapped" to the AIMD.� The aircraft maintenance

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

management functions would remain as the only permanent

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

functions within the MALS.� The drawback to this plan, as with

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the current one, is that the commander who must employ the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MALS in combat has little control over the training of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marines who will man it.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� As with the ground combat element, one of the most

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

partisan issues raised by this proposal is elimination of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

numerous commands within each MEF:� the wing headquarters,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the wing headquarters squadron, the support group, the control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

group, the air traffic control squadron, the air support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadron, the communications squadron, the headquarters and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

headquarters squadrons of both the control group and the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support group, and the LAAD and LAAM battalions.� In addition

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to these units, one MAG headquarters and its associated MALS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from I MEF and two MAG headquarters and MALS from II MEF would

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

be eliminated.� Additionally, if only 15 V-22 squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are maintained instead of 18, then one HMH and three HMM flags

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would be folded.� The final four flags to be folded would be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from the SMCR--the observation squadron, the tactical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

electronic squadron, the tactical reconnaissance squadron, and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one of the two air support squadrons (MASS).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Elimination of these units really represents elimination

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of redundant levels of command.� The warfighting capability of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the squadrons, battalions, groups and wings has been

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reorganized under another existing command.� However, in the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

few cases where actual warfighting capability was eliminated--

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three HMM, one HMH, and three SMCR squadrons, the squadrons

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

were eliminated because they were superfluous to our concept

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of employment in a low- or mid-intensity conflict.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Another major problem, though perhaps not as parochial

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

as the previous one, is the concept of employment for the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS).� The revised

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

concept of employment must address integration of the MACCS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

into the host nation or joint task force (JTF) air command and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

control system for the initial brigade that is deployed into

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the theater of conflict.� It must also account for the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

integration of subsequent brigades into the theater air

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

command and control system.� Finally, it must provide a means

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for the joint task force commander to task the MAGTF commander

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with air missions.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Once a Marine brigade, whether it was amphibious or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

maritime prepositioning force in origin, has assumed control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of air operations ashore, it must be able to exercise that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

control to the same degree of capability of that formerly of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

an aircraft wing.� Each brigade has been task organized with

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the assets of the former air control group to be able to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

provide just that degree of control.� The air control element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the aviation combat element will become integrated in the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

theater air command and control system.� In a low-intensity

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

or mid-intensity conflict, a brigade may be the only Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

force in the theater.� Thus, the air command and control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

problem is resolved.� The MACCS is completely integrated into

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the theater system and the joint task force commander can

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

directly task the MAGTF commander for air missions.� As the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

conflict escalated and the size of the Marine presence

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

increased from a MEB to a MEF, the MAGTF commander could

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

request a greater portion of the air command and control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

system.� The air control elements of each follow-on brigade

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

would link with the first air control element.� Thus, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

first element into the theater becomes the central node for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the MAGTF air command and control system.� Although the MACCS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

has expanded to a decentralized command and control system,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the joint task force air component commander still maintains a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

single point of contact with the MAGTF.� The joint task force

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commander as always has a direct line to the MAGTF commander

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for assigning any missions, air or ground.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Impact on the Combat Service Support Element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The impact of this proposal on the Brigade Service

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Support Group should be evaluated with the following,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

subjective criteria: (1) command and control, (2) training and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

supervision, (3) limited equipment, (4) peacetime

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

requirements, and (5) transition from peace to war.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Center for Naval Analysis used the same criteria for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

evaluating a BSSG structure concept (33-8.1).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� In evaluating the impact of this proposal on the BSSG

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with respect to command and control functions, one major point

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to consider is that many functions of combat service support

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are interdependent.� Coordination of these functions will

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

require the involvement of the combat service support element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commander.� This coordination also suggests abandonment of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

functional area management concept.� A commander accustomed to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

coordinating interdependent functions will, presumably, be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

more prepared to do so in combat than another commander who

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

had until just prior to deployment been assigned to a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

functional battalion.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Evaluating the impact of this proposal with respect to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

supervision and training yields two opposite conclusions.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

train as you are going to fight philosophy is firmly embraced

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

by this proposal.� Although the commander may be better

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

trained, it is impossible to predict whether the smaller

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

functional units of the BSSG, companies, foster more effective

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

military occupational specialty training than the larger units

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the FSSG.� Organizing in BSSG's increases the requirement

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for qualified supervisors.� Additionally, since the units are

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

smaller, the supervisory billets will be of a lower grade than

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in the FSSG.� The problem becomes one of not only obtaining

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

supervisors but of obtaining young, qualified supervisors.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

One of the key issues raised by this proposal is the lack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of equipment to support two brigades.� Clearly, this proposal

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

is hampered by the proliferation of oversized, expensive,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

seldom used or one-of-a-kind items within the combat service

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

support element.� The 1987 study by the Center for Naval

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Analysis discovered only seven one-of-a-kind items in the 1990

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

BSSG equipment list (33-8.8).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Another argument against this proposal is that the BSSG

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

lacks the depth of assets to be able to support conflicting

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

peacetime requirements.� Elimination of the conflicting

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

peacetime requirements is precisely the objective of this

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

proposal.� Presumably the unity of the brigade command will

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

prevent brigade units from being assigned missions that do not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

have any bearing on the brigade's� overall mission.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� All Marine Corps commands are enjoined to focus all

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

peacetime activities on achieving combat readiness (14-41).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

However, in spite of our combat readiness and our task

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organization for the most likely contingency, there will be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

some last moment "ad hocery" or refinements to the task

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

organization.� The staff of a functional battalion may be more

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

qualified than the staff of a BSSG to allocate assets during a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

task organization refinement.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Impact on the Command Element

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The adoption of this proposal will have five significant

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

effects on the command element:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 1.� Reinforcement of the principle of unity of command.

�� 2.� Support for implementation of the maneuver warfare

doctrine.

�� 3.� Complication of span of control problems.

�� 4.� Increased professional competence of the MAGTF staff.

�� 5.� Elimination of the composite MAGTF problem.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Most importantly, the MEB commander will finally have direct

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

influence on the training of the Marines he will have to lead

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in combat.� The MEB commander will now be able to maintain

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

habitual relationships with his staff and subordinate

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commanders.� However, the MEF commander will have multiple

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ground combat elements.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� With the elimination of redundant and parallel commands,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

there will be no need to "dual hat" a general officer as the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

commander of two distinctly different commands.� Additionally,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

with the elimination of the division, wing and FSSG command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

billets, there will be an excess number of general officers.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Thus the Marine Corps will change from a situation of a lack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of general officers requiring "dual hatted" commanders to a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

situation of a lack of general officer billets.� The Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Corps can meet this change by fulfilling its needs for general

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

officers elsewhere or by reducing the number of general

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

officers.� More significantly, the MAGTF commander may now

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

devote more time to fighting his MAGTF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� A second advantage of this proposal is that with the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assignment of units to the command vice the designation of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

units, the commanding general finally has control over the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

tactical proficiency of the units he will lead in combat.� By

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the existing organization, the subordinate units of the MEB

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

remained under the command and control of the parent command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

until the MAGTF was activated.� At that time, the subordinate

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

unit would shift to the operational command and control of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEB commander.� The MEB commander would have a chance to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

observe the tactical proficiency of the subordinate units only

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

during an exercise or during an actual contingency.� However,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

under this proposal, the MEB commander has the responsibility

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of not only leading his units in combat, but also of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

preparing them for war.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The adoption of his proposal facilitates acceptance of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the maneuver warfare doctrine.� The MEB commander and his

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

staff have a greater opportunity improve their tactical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

proficiency while daily commanding and controlling assigned

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

forces.� The MAGTF forces are directed toward a geographical

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

area.� Therefore, the commander and his staff will have a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

greater opportunity to identify possible antagonists and to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

perform area studies than will a commander of general purpose

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

forces, such as divisions and wings.� The information obtained

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

from the study of potential antagonists and of mission areas

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

will better prepare the MEB commander to strike at the enemy's

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

critical vulnerabilities and to destroy his will to fight.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� One difficult issue raised by this proposal is that of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

span of control.� Under the existing MAGTF organization, each

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MAGTF has normally one ground combat element.� A MEU has a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

battalion landing team; a MEB, a regimental landing team; and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a MEF, a Marine division.� The MAGTF commander could assign a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

mission to the ground combat element commander and allow him

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to coordinate the fires and maneuver of his regiments.� It is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

possible that a MEF commander might have two ground combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

elements, each consisting of a Marine division.� Due to the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

size of each of these ground combat elements, it is highly

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

unlikely that they would be assigned the same objective.� For

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the purposes of maneuver and fire support coordination, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

two ground combat elements could be considered to be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

conducting independent operations.� Under the proposed

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reorganization, a MEF would have two or more MEB's, each with

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

a regimental landing team.� In this case, MEF commander would

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

now have to direct and coordinate the fires and maneuver of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

each regimental landing team since it is most likely that all

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the ground combat elements would be assigned missions on

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the same objective.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Permanent MAGTF headquarters were created, in part, out

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of a concern for the professional competence of the MAGTF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

staff.� With the existing MAGTF headquarters, the staff may

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

develop develop the necessary relationships to operate

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

efficiently.� However, one of the major functions of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

staff is to assist the MAGTF commander in integrating the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat power of his subordinate elements.� Now with forces

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

assigned, the staff will be able to practice in peacetime

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the tasks they must accomplish in combat.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This proposal may eliminate the composite MAGTF problem.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Under this reorganization, there will be no headlong drive to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

get the MEF, division, wing and FSSG headquarters into the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

theater of conflict.� Each MEB is fully capable of commanding

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and controlling all the functions of the aviation, ground

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat and combat service support elements and fighting as an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

integrated MAGTF.� The MEF commander exercises control over

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the combat units through his subordinate MEB commander.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEF commander and his staff are, therefore, required in the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

theater of conflict only when more than one MEB is present.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Impact on Manpower Structure

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Although this proposal may produce beneficial effects on

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

each element of the MAGTF, it must produce significant

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

manpower savings to warrant the turmoil of reorganization.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

There are three major manpower concerns that must be addressed:

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 1.� Number of saved or excess billets.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 2.� Officer and enlisted grade distribution.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� 3.� MOS progression.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Manpower structure is dependent on the personnel budget

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and rank distribution.� For a given budget, the number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

billets that can be created is dependent on the annual pay,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

hence the rank, of the billet holder.� It is, therefore, not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

particularly useful to simply count the number of excess

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

billets created by the proposal.� Those billets must be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

related to their impact on the personnel budget.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Since annual pay is one of the largest direct operating

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

costs included in the personnel budget, any analysis should

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

use annual pay as the sole cost of a billet.� The difficulty

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

in expressing excess billets strictly in terms of dollars is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that the figures lose significance.� Therefore, the cost of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

each billet shall be normalized by the average annual pay of a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Private/Private First Class.� Table 3 lists the average annual

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

pay for Marines of each rank.� Table 4 summarizes the ratio

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

between the average annual pay of a Pvt/PFC and all the other

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

ranks.� A cursory view of these tables shows that a Sergeant

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Major has an average annual pay of $37,827, which is roughly

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

3.5 times greater than that of a Pvt/PFC.� Therefore, on a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

dollar basis, a Sergeant Major's billet is equivalent to 3.5

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Pvt/PFC billets.� Likewise, a colonel's billet is equivalent

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

to 6.0 Pvt/PFC billets.� Table 5 lists the excess manpower

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Click here to view image

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

structure created within each MEF by abolishing the command

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

elements of those 29 units.� The excess billets of each unit

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

are listed by the number of enlisted billets, the number of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

officer billets, and the number of Pvt/PFC equivalents.� A

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

brief look at Table 5 shows that although 95 officers and 274

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

enlisted Marines are assigned to the Wing Headquarters, their

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

average annual pay is equivalent to that of 921 privates.� By

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

way of comparison, a rifle company has an equivalent pay of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

244.6 privates and a medium helicopter squadron, 364.5 privates.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� With the elimination of 29 command elements in each MEF,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Marine Corps realizes a total excess of 12,792 enlisted

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

billets and 1830 officer billets.� Table 6 lists the total

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

number of excess billets by rank.� These numbers represent

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� TABLE 6

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� EXCESS BILLETS

Pvt/PFC�� LCpl�� Cpl�� Sgt�� SSgt�� GySgt�� 1stSgt�� SgtMaj

2085� �� 3372�� 2988�� 2031�� 1225�� 870�� 489�� 318

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Lts�� Capt�� Maj�� LtCol�� Col�� Gen

�� 330�� 555�� 414�� 234�� 87�� 15

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

7.2% of the enlisted strength and 9.0% of the officer

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

strength.� The total annual pay of these billets is over $305

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

million, which is approximately 8.6% of the estimated $3,549

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

million the Marine Corps spends for pay.� By comparison, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

annual payroll of 114 rifle companies or 75 medium helicopter

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons is less than that of these excess billets.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Although this proposal represents a 7.2% reduction in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

enlisted strength and a 9.0% reduction in officer strength,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

there is no significant change in the remaining grade

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

distribution.� Figures 20 and 21 compare the existing grade

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

distribution with that as a consequence of this proposal for

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both enlisted Marines and Marine officers, respectively.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

greatest change in the enlisted distribution is just 3/10th of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

one percent.� The officer ranks show a slight skewing toward

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the lower grades with the ratio of lieutenants increasing 2.4%.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Even though the grade distribution remains the same, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

proposal does create a problem with MOS progression for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

officers.� The same problem of diminished command opportunity

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that artillery officers, tracked vehicle officers, and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

engineer officers face in the ground combat element will

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

confront combat service support officers, air defense

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

officers, air support officers and air traffic control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

officers.� In the enlisted ranks, MOS progression is not

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

exacerbated by the proposal since the preponderance of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

excess senior enlisted billets were taken from the division,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wing, and FSSG staffs.� Again, the candid response to this

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

problem is not all Marines will be afforded the opportunity

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

for a major command; nor will they all be afforded the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

opportunity to serve for twenty years.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Clearly, this proposal can produce significant manpower

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

savings.� It will, of course, take some time to abolish these

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

billets and to relocate the billet holders before the savings

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

can be realized.� If the personnel budget is drastically

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reduced requiring vertical cuts in the manpower structure,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

then this proposal offers an excellent opportunity to absorb

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

those cuts without sacrificing combat efficiency.

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�� Impact on Public Law

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Section 5013, Title 10, United States Code, currently

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

states, "The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

divisions and three air wings and such other land combat,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aviation, and other services as may be organic therein" (2-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

606).� Prior to implementation of this proposal, this section

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of Title 10 must be amended.� A simple but sufficient

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

amendment is to replace the words "three combat divisions and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three air wings" with "three Marine Expeditionary Forces."

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

The effect of this change must be measured against the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

legislative intent of the original version and how well that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

purpose has been achieved.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Following the post-World War II military unification

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

hearings, Congress, in addition to establishing the charter of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the modern Marine Corps, established its composition.� Section

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

206(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 stated, "The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

as may be organic therein" (40-31).� This broad description of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Marine Corps composition did not establish its minimum

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

size.� President Harry Truman and the top leadership of the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

new Department of Defense, including Secretary of Defense

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, were

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

openly hostile toward the continued existence of the Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Corps as a co-equal service.� Since these men held budgetary

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

authority over the Marine Corps, the strength of the Corps

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

fell from over 92,000 in 1947 to under 75,000 in 1950 (40-38).

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea stopped the almost

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

certain elimination of the Marine Corps or at least, its

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

reversion to its traditional role with greatly reduced size

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and influence.� Despite the performance of the 1st Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Division in Korea, the civilian leadership in the Pentagon

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

remained hostile to the Marine Corps.� However, Congress

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

passed the Douglas-Mansfield Act (Public Law 82-416) on 20

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

June 1952, giving the Commandant of the Marine Corps co-equal

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

status with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all issues of direct

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

interest to the Marine Corps.� The Act also established the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

current language of Title 10, Section 5013.� Thus, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

legislative intent of the Act was to protect the existence of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Marine Corps by establishing a minimum strength.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

The terms "combat division" and "air wing" are

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

sufficiently vague that one may argue for any sized Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Corps based on his definition of the terms.� Since 1952, the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

size of a Marine infantry division has varied widely.� The

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

size of an Army division has also varied in size during that

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

period.� Even today the strength of any Army division

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

(infantry, light infantry, mechanized, air assault, airborne,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

or armor) is different from that of any Marine division.� In

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

fact, the strength of each Marine division differs from each

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

other.� A Marine aircraft wing is significantly larger, by an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

order of magnitude, than a comparably named Navy or Air Force

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

unit.� To the Air Force and the Navy, an air wing is the next

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

level unit above a squadron.� The embodiment of the Navy's

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

definition is the carrier air wing or functional wing.� Marine

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

aircraft wings, which number approximately 400 aircraft, dwarf

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Navy carrier air or type commander wings and the Air Force

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wings, each of which number less than 100 aircraft.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� Although the Douglas-Mansfield Act ensured the continued

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

existence of the Marine Corps in the early 1950's, has the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

wording of the Act, ". . . not less than three combat

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

divisions and three air wings . . .", protected the manpower

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

strength of the Marine Corps from falling below that level?� A

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

quick review of the strength of the Marine Corps today answers

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that question with a resounding NO!� The Third Marine Division

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

currently has but four infantry battalions, two tank

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

companies, and two amphibious assault battalions.� The First

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength with but two

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

fighter/attack squadrons, two attack squadrons, one refueler

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadron and one each, medium, heavy, and light/attack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter squadron.� Clearly, the Third Marine Division and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the First Marine Aircraft Wing are not a full "combat division

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

and air wing" within the intent of the law.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The change in wording from "three combat divisions and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

three air wings" to "three Marine Expeditionary Forces" does

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

not change the basic meaning, intent, or protection afforded

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

by the original law.� Although the change replaces the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

original nebulous terms with equally nebulous terms, the new

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

terms reflect the current Marine Corps employment philosophy.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

It is clear from the legislative history of the Douglas-

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Mansfield Act that the people of the United States want a

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

Marine Corps.� This change does not affect that basic desire

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the people.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� CHAPTER III

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� CONCLUSIONS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This plan is a viable alternative to the current organization

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

of the Fleet Marine Forces.� The plan provides the opportunity to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

realign manpower structure from redundant units to combat arms

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

units.� The proposal also provides a rational basis for aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

programming decisions.� Lastly, it provides an organization

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

that is conducive to the implementation of the Marine Corps

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

warf ighting doctrine.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The plan eliminates 29 redundant headquarters within each

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

MEF.� The manpower structure of these excess units equates to

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

114 rifle companies.� This structure can be redirected into

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

combat arms units to fulfill critical needs, such as a fourth

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

rifle company in each infantry battalion or an additional

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

light/attack helicopter squadron or, the excess structure can

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

be eliminated outright, thus creating a substantial savings in

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

the Marine Corps military personnel account.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The proposal can be implemented immediately except for

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

several aviation considerations.� The current distribution of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

squadrons and capabilities is insufficient to meet the

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

requirements of the Marine Corps under this organizational

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

plan. �However, the identified deficiencies in light/attack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

helicopter, heavy lift helicopter, and all-weather attack

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

capabilities provides a rational basis for aviation

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

programming decisions.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� This proposal vastly complicates the span of control

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� problems for the MEF commander in combat.� The MEF will be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� composed of three subordinate MEB's.� Since none of the MEB's

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� will possess sufficient combat power to achieve a MEF

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� objective single handedly, the MEF commander must coordinate

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� the elements of two or more MEB's on a single objective.� This

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� issue could be resolved prior to acceptance of the proposal or

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� simply tabled in the expectation that a MEF would not be

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� employed as a complete unit in the foreseeable future.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The warfighting doctrine of the Marine Corps requires

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� harmonious sychronization of the independent initiative of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� subordinate commanders.� This can only be achieved by the close

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� and continuous relationship for the senior commander and his

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� subordinates.� This proposal contains an organizational scheme

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� that supports the establishment of those relationships.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�� The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� NOT "broken."� Division-wing teams have served the needs of

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� the Marine Corps for many years.� As we view the next century,

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� we see the Marine Corps racked by budgetary constraints and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� often employed on short notice in stability operations and

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�limited objective operations.� We should adopt an

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� organizational structure that is maximized for those

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

� operations and one that can survive financial austerity.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�Click here to view image

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

�

�� BIBLIOGRAPHY

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

1.�� Commandant of the Marine Corps message.� "Execution for POM

90-94 MAGTF Structure and Manning Requirements." �Washington:

HQMC, 222030z June 1988.� Provided implementing instructions for

the recommendations of the Force Structure Study Group, 1988.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

2.�� United States Government.� United States Code, Title 10.

Washington:� Government Printing Office, 1983.� Provided specific

wording of the law that establishes the mission and size of the

Marine Corps.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

3.�� United States Marine Corps.� Organization and Composition of

the Fleet Marine Force (Hogaboom Board).� Washington:� HQMC,

1956.� Primarily concerned with the organizaton and composition

of the Division, Wing, and Force Troops.� Concerned about the

impact of reduced military budgets and manpower.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

4.�� United States Marine Corps.� MAGTF Master Plan (Final

Draft).� Quantico:� Marine Corps Combat Development Center, 1989.

Provided direction for the Marine Corps during the next decade.

Defined levels of conflict.� Provided guidance on force structure.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

5.�� United States Marine Corps.� Report of the Force Structure

Study Group.� Washington:� HQMC, 1988.� Recommended structure

changes that would provide a Total Force capability of fighting

and winning the most likely conflicts of the 1990's.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

6.�� United States Marine Corps.� Guidelines for� Forming a

Composite MAGTF.� Washington:� Advanced Amphibious Study Group,

1985.� Provided an initial concept for compositing a MEB to a MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

7.�� United States Marine Corps.� "Final Report:� 1-85 Compositing

Evaluation."� Camp Pendleton:� I Marine Amphibious Force, 1985.

Evaluated several techniques for compositing a MEB to a MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

8.�� United States Marine Corps.� "C4I Study:� Report of First

Study Iteration."� Camp Pendleton:� I MAF, 1985.� Initial report

of an evaluation of several techniques for compositing a MEB to a

MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

9.�� United States Marine Corps.� Headquarters Redundancy

Analysis (Board of Colonels).� Washington:� HQMC, 1987.

Evaluated missions of FMFLant/Pac, MEF, MEB, Division, Wing, and

FSSG headquarters. Also evaluated missions of bases and stations.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

10.� United States Marine Corps.� Fleet Marine Force (IP 1-4).

Quantico:� MCCDC, 1987.� Provided a somewhat dated description of

the organization of the Fleet Marine Forces.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

11.� United States Marine Corps.� "Tables of Organization."

Washington:� HQMC, 1988.� Invaluable resource for evaluating

manpower and organizational requirements of the Fleet Marine

Forces.� Obtained tables of organization on computer diskettes

from the Central Design and Programming Activity, Quantico.� That

form proved much easier to use than paper or microfiche forms.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

12.� United States Marine Corps.� Mission and Force Structure

Study (Haynes Board).� Washington:� Headquarters Marine Corps,

1976.� Described major considerations for both keeping the Division,

Wing, and FSSG organization, and for adopting a permanent brigade

organization.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

13.� United States Marine Corps.� Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Doctrine (FMFM 0-1).� Washington:� HQMC, 1979.� Provided a

cursory explanation of the roles of the various MAGTF's and how

they function.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

14.� United States Marine Corps.� Warfighting (FMFM 1).

Washington:� HQMC, 1989.� Provided the Marine Corps philosophy on

command and control in combat.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

15.� United States Marine Corps.� The Permanent MAGTF

Headquarters Concept and How It Applies in the Formation of a

Composite MAGTF.� Washington:� Advanced Amphibious Study Group,

1985.� Provided a revised concept of compositing a MEB to a MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

16.� United States Marine Corps.� Concepts and Issues.

Washington:� HQMC, February l989.� Provided an explanation for

Congress for the need for various Marine Corps programs for the

next decade.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

17.� United States Navy.� Department of the Navy Long Term

Amphibious Lift Requirement and Optimum Ship Mix Study.

Washington:� Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1983.

Presented programs to provide the assets required to conduct

amphibious assaults with a MEF and a MEB by 1994.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

LETTERS AND MEMORANDA

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

18.� Commandant of the Marine Corps memorandum for the Chief of

Staff, HQMC.� 8 March 1985.� Provided the Commandant's views on

the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

19.� Chief of Staff, HQMC memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff

(Plans, Policies and Operations).� 15 January 1985.� Provided the

Chief of Staff's views on the revised, permanent MAGTF

headquarters concept.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

20.� Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations),

HQMC memorandum for the Assistant Commandant.� "Marine Air Ground

Task Force Headquarters Decision Brief."� 8 June 1983.� Provided

the background information leading to the decision to approve the

permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

21.� Director, Operations Division memorandum to Deputy Chief of

Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations), HQMC.� "Permanent MAGTF

HQ Concept."� l March 1985.� Provided a summary of the revised,

permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

22.� Special Assistant for Amphibious and Prepositioning Matters

(PP&O) memorandum for the Commandant, HQMC.� "Permanent MAGTF

Headquarters Concept."� 13 January 1985.� Provided, as a marginal

note, the Commandant's views on the revised, permanent MAGTF

headquarters concept.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

23.� Brigadier General Marc A. Cisneros, USA, United States

Southern Command.� Letter to author.� 7 February 1989.� Provided

the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command,

requires of a MEB or MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

24.� Major General J. P. Hoar, USMC, United States Central

Command. Letter to author.� 30 January 1989.� Excellent response

to author's letter.� Provided the response time the Commander-in-

Chief, U.S. Central Command, requires of a MEB or MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

25.� Major General Royal N. Moore, Jr, USMC, United States

Pacific Command.� Letter to author.� 27 January 1989.� Provided

the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,

requires of a MEB or MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

26.� Major General H. C. Stackpole, III, USMC, United States

Atlantic Command.� Letter to author.� 15 February 1989.� Provided

the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command,

requires of a MEB or MEF.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

27.� Lieutenant General E. J. Godfrey, USMC.� Address to the ACMC

Committee.� Washington:� HQMC, 30 January 1989.� Provided the

views of the Commanding General, FMF Pacific, on force structure

reductions.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

28.� Colonel Michael Wyly, USMC.� "Modernizing the MAGTF."

Unpublished essay.� Provided a discussion of the need to

reorganize from divisions and wings to brigades.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

29.� Lieutenant General E. T. Cook, USMC.� Commanding General,

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, letter,� "Standardization of MEU

(SOC) Troop and Equipment Lists.� 28 June 1988.� Provided the

organizational strengths of each element of the MEU.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

BOOKS AND JOURNALS

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

30.� Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record.� Where Does the Marine

Corps Go From Here?� Washington:� Brookings Institute, 1976.

Discussed post-Vietnam War missions for the Marine Corps as a

whole.� Not a significant value for this project.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

31.� Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford.� Progress and

Purpose:� A Developmental History of the United States Marine

Corps, 1900-1970.� Washington:� History and Museums Division,

HQMC, 1973.� Emphasized the innovations of the Marine Corps.

Briefly discussed the environment and recommendations of the

Hogaboom Board.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

32.� Lieutenant Colonel John S. Grinalds, USMC.� Structures for

the Marine Corps for the 1980's and 1990's.� Washington:

National Defense University, 1978.� Discusses structure of Marine

Corps in terms of global mission.� Not of significant value for

this project.

33.� Mark T. Lewellyn, Dana Burwell, Harold Furchtgott-Roth,

Dwight Lyons, and Margaret Tierney.� Analysis of the Marine Corps

Combat Service Support Structure.� Alexandria:� Center for Naval

Analysis, April 1987.� Provided indepth analysis of several

organizational structures of the combat service support elements,

including a permanent BSSG.� Recommended for further study.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

34.� Allan R. Millett.� Semper Fidelis, The History of the United

States Marine Corps.� New York:� Macmillan Publishing Company,

Inc, 1980.� Provided scholarly overview of the history of the

Marine Corps.� Greatest value was the extensive bibliography.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

35.� Lieutenant Colonel Ronald R. Borowitz, USMC.� "Improving Marine

Air," Marine Corps Gazette.� February 1984.� Recommended forming

one composite MAG within each MEF for service as a MEB ACE.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

36.� Major Robert J. Bozelli, USMC.� "Rethinking MACCS," Marine

Corps Gazette.� October 1988.� Identifies mobility,

survivability, communication, and training as deficiencies with

the MACCS.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

37.� Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Flynn, USMC and Major D. A.

Quinlan, USMC.� "The Brigade is Beautiful," Marine Corps

Gazette.� September 1972.� Proposed reorganizing into seven

MEB's.� Each FMF would also have a Force Logistics Command, a

Force Aviation Command, a Fleet Marine Training Command, and a

Combat Support Command.� The Combat Service Command would fall

under the command of the base commanders.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

38.� Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, USMC.� "CSS for the MAGTF,"

Marine Corps Gazette.� May 1985.� Identifies the duplicity of

effort between the FSSG and the MWSS.� Recommends transferring

more functions from the FSSG to the MWSS to develop a MAG service

support group.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

39.� Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr, USMC.� "The Cat with More than Nine

Lives," Proceedings.� June 1954.� Presents the historical account

of the events leading up to the passage of Public Law 82-416.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

40.� Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr, USMC.� "The Right to Fight," Proceedin

September 1962.� Presents the historical account of the events

leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947

and of Public Law 82-416.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

41.� Captain Timothy E. Junette, USMC.� "Reorganizing Marine Corps

Aviation," Marine Corps Gazette.� October 1988.� Describes the

problems of compositing the Aviation Combat Element of a MEB.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

42.� Lieutenant Colonel Willis J. King, Jr, USMC.� "Tailoring Marine

Aviation For the Task at Hand," Marine Corps Gazette.� October

1988.� Discusses the problem of task organizing aviation assets

for a MAGTF is a period of austere budgets.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

43.� Major T. C. Linn, USMC.� "The Composite MAGTF Concept,"

Marine Corps Gazette.� August 1984.� Describes several techniques

for compositing various MAGTF's.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

44.� Captain Jeffery L Kreinbring, USMC.� "Let's Organize for the

Mission," Marine Corps Gazette.� October 1987.� Proposes

reorganizing into eight MEB's--three MPF, three amphib, and 2 to

support 3 MEU's on each coast__with abolition of the Division,

Wing, and FSSG.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

45.� Major T. C. Morgan, USMC.� "Deploying and Employing,"

Marine Corps Gazette.� May 1984.� Proposed Marine Corps-wide

standardization of unit SOP's, thus facilitating employment of a

force task organized from two or more divisions or wings.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

46.� Colonel E. F. Riley, USMC.� "Command Relationships in the

MAGTF,"� Marine Corps Gazette.� July 1985.� Describes

deficiencies in the MAGTF command structure that impede its

operation as a combined arms team.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]>�<![endif]>

47.� Jack Shulinson and Major Edward F. Wells, USMC.� "First In,

First Out,"� Marine Corps Gazette.� January 1984.� Described the

events leading to the introduction of the 9th MEB into combat in

Vietnam.

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