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Obergefell v. Hodges
576 U.S. ___ (2015)

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Justia Opinion Summary
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Plaintiffs challenged the laws as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The district courts ruled in their favor. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state. The Court noted other changes in the institution of marriage: the decline of arranged marriages, invalidation of bans on interracial marriage and use of contraception, and abandonment of the law of coverture. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Marriage is a centerpiece of social order and fundamental under the Constitution; it draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. The marriage laws at issue harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples; burden the liberty of same-sex couples; and abridge central precepts of equality. There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive litigation have led to an enhanced understanding of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek to teach the principles that are central to their lives and faiths.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OBERGEFELL et al. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit

No. 14–556. Argued April 28, 2015—Decided June 26, 2015[1]

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners’ favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.

Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State. Pp. 3–28.

(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court. Pp. 3–10.

(1) The history of marriage as a union between two persons of the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases. To the respondents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage were extended to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far from seeking to devalue marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities, as illustrated by the petitioners’ own experiences. Pp. 3–6.

(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. Changes, such as the decline of arranged marriages and the abandonment of the law of coverture, have worked deep transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting aspects of marriage once viewed as essential. These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution. Changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations.

This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay and lesbian rights. Well into the 20th century, many States condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as an illness. Later in the century, cultural and political developments allowed same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives. Extensive public and private dialogue followed, along with shifts in public attitudes. Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where they could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law. In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 , which upheld a Georgia law that criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 . In 2012, the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___. Numerous same-sex marriage cases reaching the federal courts and state supreme courts have added to the dialogue. Pp. 6–10.

(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. Pp. 10–27.

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 –486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 , invalidated bans on interracial unions, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 , held that prisoners could not be denied the right to marry. To be sure, these cases presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 , a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed broader principles. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454. This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. Pp. 10–12.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12. Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.

A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U. S., at 485, and was acknowledged in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extending beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a criminal offense. See Lawrence, supra, at 567.

A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 . Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. Precedent protects the right of a married couple not to procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to procreate.

Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 . States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.

The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Pp. 12–18.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court invoked both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 , where the Court invalidated a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455 –461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 –121.

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. Pp. 18–22.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these cases are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Pp. 22–23.

(5) There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive litigation in state and federal courts have led to an enhanced understanding of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. Bowers, in effect, upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right. Though it was eventually repudiated, men and women suffered pain and humiliation in the interim, and the effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the issue they present to the Court, which has a duty to address these claims and answer these questions. Respondents’ argument that allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples’ decisions about marriage and parenthood. Finally, the First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths. Pp. 23–27.

(c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character. Pp. 27–28.

772 F. 3d 388, reversed.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.

Notes

1  Together with No. 14–562, Tanco et al. v. Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, et al., No. 14–571, DeBoer et al. v. Snyder, Governor of Michigan, et al., and No. 14–574, Bourke et al. v. Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, also on certiorari to the same court.

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Primary Holding

Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, all states must license a marriage between two people of the same sex and recognize such a marriage if it was lawfully licensed and performed in another state.

Facts

In Ohio, John Arthur was suffering from the latter stages of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a terminal illness. Recognizing the need to make critical end-of-life decisions, Arthur sought to have the Ohio Registrar identify his partner, James Obergefell, as his surviving spouse on his death certificate so that Obergefell could receive the benefits due to a spouse. Arthur and Obergefell had married in Maryland two years earlier. The Registrar planned to certify Obergefell as Arthur's spouse on the death certificate, believing that discrimination against same-sex couples was unconstitutional. The state of Ohio prohibited same-sex marriage, however, and its Attorney General's Office mobilized to defend that ban.

Also in Ohio, four same-sex couples brought a claim seeking the right to list both parents on the birth certificates of their children. In this case, known as Henry v. Wymyslo, three of the couples lived in Ohio, and all of the children were born there. Henry v. Wymyslo was heard before the same judge who reviewed the Obergefell case, District Judge Timothy S. Black.

In Tennessee, four same-sex couples sued to force the state to recognize their marriages, which had been performed in California and New York. (One of the New York couples later left the case.) They argued that Tennessee's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages violated its own rule that a marriage validated where it is celebrated is valid everywhere.

In Michigan, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse brought a claim on behalf of themselves and three children whom they sought to jointly adopt. All of the children, one boy and two girls, had special needs. The two nurses challenged a state law prohibiting adoption by same-sex couples and limiting second-parent adoption to married couples, while defining marriage as between opposite-sex individuals only.

In Kentucky, Gregory Bourke and Michael DeLeon brought a claim on behalf of themselves and DeLeon's two adopted children. Three other couples, one with four children, joined their claim. While Bourke and DeLeon were legally married in Ontario, Canada, the other couples were married in Iowa, California, and Connecticut.

The couples prevailed in the federal district courts of all four states. In Obergefell, District Judge Black issued a temporary restraining order, which the state did not appeal, and planned oral arguments on whether a permanent injunction should be granted. Unfortunately, Arthur died before arguments were held, and the state moved within a week to dismiss the case as moot. Black denied the motion and ruled two months later that Ohio must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states on death certificates. He also issued an order in Henry v. Wymyslo that required states to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, although he stayed the enforcement of his ruling with respect to matters other than the birth certificates sought in this specific case.

All four of these cases were appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the trial court decisions in each of them and reinstated the state bans on same-sex marriage. (Some observers, including the dissenting justice in the Sixth Circuit's 2-1 decision, speculated that the court took this view deliberately to force the Supreme Court to resolve the ensuing circuit split and provide a definitive answer on the issue of marriage equality.) The Supreme Court then consolidated the cases for review. Since the federal government previously had announced its support for marriage equality, U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr. joined the plaintiffs' lawyers for oral argument before the Court.

Procedural History

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - No. 14-3057 (November 6, 2014)

States do not violate the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting same-sex marriage, and the legislature rather than the court system is the appropriate place for pursuing this type of change. These claims also do not present a substantial federal question.

Attorneys

  • Mary Bonauto (plaintiffs)
  • Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (plaintiffs)
  • Donald Verrilli, Jr. (plaintiffs; U.S. Solicitor General)
  • John J. Bursch (defendants; Michigan Solicitor General)
  • Joseph R. Whalen (defendants; Tennessee Associate Solicitor General)

Opinions

Majority

  • Anthony M. Kennedy (Author)
  • Ruth Bader Ginsburg
  • Stephen G. Breyer
  • Sonia Sotomayor
  • Elena Kagan

Marriage is central to personal identity, dignity, and autonomy. Thus, it is a fundamental right that has strong protections under the Fourteenth Amendment, both independently and through its connection to related fundamental rights regarding child-rearing, procreation, and education. State bans on same-sex marriage clearly infringe on all of these rights by restricting the liberty of same-sex couples, harming the development of their children, and undermining principles of equality that lie at the core of American society.

Over time, this institution has evolved significantly from its traditional origins. Archaic practices such as arranged marriages and the law of coverture have been abandoned. This Court has struck down state bans on the use of contraception (see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) and on interracial marriage (see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). There is no longer a reason to hesitate before recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marriage equality, for the merits of the issue have become abundantly clear through legislative debates, academic research, and a long history of litigation. Legislative action through the democratic process is the usual mechanism for change, but courts may intervene on behalf of people whose fundamental rights have been infringed. Granting marriage equality to same-sex couples accords them the equal dignity under the law to which they are constitutionally entitled.

Dissent

  • John G. Roberts, Jr. (Author)
  • Antonin Scalia
  • Clarence Thomas

This is a policy decision that should be left to legislatures, as demonstrated by the writings of the Framers and earlier decisions of this Court. The majority has engaged in inappropriate judicial activism by taking this issue out of their hands. States should be free to define marriage as they see fit.

Dissent

  • Antonin Scalia (Author)
  • Clarence Thomas

The majority's decision threatens the democratic principles at the core of American society by allowing the judgment of an elite few to substitute for the will of the many.

Dissent

  • Clarence Thomas (Author)
  • Antonin Scalia

The majority distorts the principles expressed by the Framers of the Constitution by portraying human dignity as granted by the government rather than emanating from the individual. The Constitution is meant to provide freedom from government intervention rather than the right to receive a government entitlement.

Dissent

  • Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (Author)
  • Antonin Scalia
  • Clarence Thomas

There is no textual basis in the Constitution or the history surrounding it that prevents states from developing their own definitions of marriage. Rather than focusing on what the states are constitutionally required to do, the majority substitutes a more nebulous view of what they should do, which is not within the Court's power to determine.

Case Commentary

This decision essentially ends the debate over whether same-sex marriage is legal or constitutionally required. It also marks the endpoint of the following 20-year trajectory in which the Court gradually expanded the scope of rights for America's LGBTQ+ community:

- Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996): States may not openly deny protected status to individuals based on sexual orientation.
- Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): Sexual intercourse between members of the same sex is legal throughout the U.S. as a constitutional right.
- U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. __ (2013): The federal government may not restrict its definition of marriage to heterosexual relationships.

All four of these decisions were authored by Kennedy, whose legacy as a Supreme Court Justice likely will consist of his impact on gay rights.

The United States becomes the 23rd country to recognize marriage equality, joining Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom (except for Northern Ireland), Finland, France, French Guiana, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.

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